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Recent Decisions
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-ABORTION-FATHER'S RIGHTS-The Supreme
Court of Massachusetts has denied injunctive and declaratory relief
to a father seeking to restrain the mother of his child from procuring
an abortion.
Doe v. Doe, 314 N.E.2d 128 (Mass. 1974).
Doe v. Doe' is one of a number of recent cases to entertain and
dismiss a father's request to prevent the mother of his child from
procuring an abortion.' This case was a response to the United
States Supreme Court's invitation to expand or delimit the elusive
concept of right of privacy upon which the abortion decision of Roe
v. Wade3 rests. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts re-
1. 314 N.E.2d 128 (Mass. 1974). See Mellinkoff, Who Is "John Doe"?, 12 U.C.L.A.L. Rev.
79 (1964) for a discussion of the history and purpose of the pseudonym "Doe."
2. E.g., Coe v. Gerstein, 376 F. Supp. 695 (S.D. Fla. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 279
(1974); Doe v. Rampton, 366 F. Supp. 189 (D. Utah), vacated and remanded, 410 U.S. 950
(1973); Coe v. General Hosp., Civil No. 1477-71 (D.D.C. June 5, 1972) (hospital's spousal
consent requirement for both abortion and sterilization held to be unconstitutional); Jones
v. Smith, 278 So. 2d 339 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 958 (1974); Pound
v. Pound, 42 U.S.L.W. 2456 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Jan. 31, 1974); cf. Doe v. Bellin Memorial Hosp.,
479 F.2d 756 (7th Cir. 1973) (putative father held not to be an indispensible party to a suit
brought by a woman and her physician challenging a private hospital's regulations prohibit-
ing abortion). Contra, Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, Civil No. 74-416C(A) (E.D. Mo. Jan.
1975) (state spousal consent statute upheld as furthering the state's compelling interest in
the "integrity of the marriage unit and the mutuality of decisions made by the partners to
that unit").
The petitioner in Doe requested injunctive and declaratory relief against both his wife and
her licensed attending physician. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 19 (1970), imposed crimi-
nal penalties on anyone performing an abortion unless done to preserve the life or health of
the mother. Kudish v. Board of Registration in Medicine, 356 Mass. 98, 99-100, 248 N.E.2d
264, 266 (1969). This statute was rendered unconstitutional by the decision of Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973). Women of the Commonwealth v. Quinn, Civil No. 71-2420-W (D. Mass.
Feb. 21, 1973). This left the interests of petitioner in Doe unprotected.
3. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The Court stated:
[W]e [do not] discuss the father's rights, if any exist in the constitutional context,
in the abortion decision. No parental right has been asserted . . . . We need not now
decide whether [statutory provisions requiring the consent of the spouse] are constitu-
tional.
Id. at 165 n.67.
4. At issue in Roe were the rights of an unmarried woman under a criminal abortion
statute. The prospective father's consent to the abortion was assumed for purposes of the
disposition of the case; in Doe, the estranged husband and prospective father objected to the
abortion. Unlike Roe, the pregnancy in Doe was desired by both parties at the time of
conception.
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garded any potential right of the father as virtually foreclosed by the
Roe decision: It did not question the appropriateness of the applica-
tion of Roe to the facts before it,' nor did the court explore other
traditional and emerging concepts of the rights and duties of the
father which might be inconsistent with its decision. While it is
clear that rights of both the father and mother were at issue, the Doe
court's opinion reflects the view that the delicate question of the
father's rights was subordinate. The purpose of this note is to show
how a more balanced and reasoned approach could have been taken.
The question presented to the court was whether the father has
any rights in the abortion decision. 5 The court's response was a
qualified "no"-at least not before the fetus is viable.' To hold
otherwise would be inconsistent with Roe v. Wade and with recent
case law which has shown little sympathy for the father's claim.7
The effect of acknowledging a right of the father would be twofold:
The state could be summoned to protect this right, and a correlative
duty would be imposed on the mother to carry the pregnancy to
term.8 The issue thus arises whether, in balancing the interests of
the mother and father, the father's interest is substantial enough to
warrant state interference on his behalf through injunctive or
declaratory relief.
RIGHT OF PRIVACY
Aside from Justice Douglas' concurring opinion,"5 the Roe Court's
opinion adds little more to the definition of the judicially-created
right of privacy than the specific holding that abortion is to be
included in that right. The Court avoided a concrete definition of
privacy and argued by analogy: Since the constitutional right of
5. Brief for Petitioner at 3, Doe v. Doe, 314 N.E.2d 128 (Mass. 1974). This question is
essentially one of the husband's standing. By deciding the issue on the merits, the court
evidently presumed the standing requirement was met.
6. 314 N.E.2d at 132.
7. See note 2 supra.
8. Jenkins, The Concept of Rights and the Competence of Courts, 18 AM. J.
JURISPRUDENCE 1, 1-2 (1973).
9. See Comment, Abortion and the Husband's Consent, 13 J. FAMILY L. 311 & n.6 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as FAMILY LAW Comment]. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), recognized
two compelling state interests-the protection of maternal life and the protection of potential
human life-both qualifying the woman's right to an abortion. Id. at 154. The plaintiff in
Doe was asserting rights independent of those the state might have.
10. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 211-15 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring).
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privacy has been applied to activities relating to marriage, procrea-
tion, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and educa-
tion, the right of privacy is logically extended to include the abor-
tion decision."
The rationale of the Roe Court, premised upon a substantive
constitutional right by analogy, has been criticized as being inade-
quate and illogical and as opening up the use of the ultimate hold-
ing to indiscriminate expansion or restriction.' 3 This prediction was
fulfilled in Doe when the Massachusetts court lifted the Roe holding
out of context and used it as a basis for denying relief to the prospec-
tive father. Although the Doe court made pro forma mention of the
father's rights historically'" and as construed before Roe v. Wade,'5
11. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973).
12. E.g., Tribe, Forward: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and Law,
87 HARV. L. REV. 1, 3-7 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Tribe]; Vieira, Roe and Doe: Substantive
Due Process and the Right of Abortion, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 867, 873, 877 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as Vieira].
13. Vieira, supra note 12, at 877-78.
[Inadequately reasoned opinions are characteristically as vulnerable as they are
threatening. Precisely because such opinions have not been properly explained, they
can either be greatly expanded or severely restricted in future cases. So it is with Roe
and Doe. Those cases . . . . add relatively little, other than the specific right of
abortion, to what had been decided in Griswold v. Connecticut.
Id.
14. 314 N.E.2d at 131. In ancient Greece and Rome, if abortions were proscribed at all, it
was on the basis of an intentional interference with the father's right to his offspring. Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 130 (1973). At common law, abortions performed before "quickening"
were allowed, without reference to the husband's consent. How relevant the common law is
to a decision in 1974 is indeed questionable, particularly since many matters not prohibited
at common law have since been regulated by statute. See note 15 infra; cf. Vieira, supra note
12, at 873-74 (citing narcotics traffic as an example of an activity permitted at common law
but since regulated by statute).
15. 314 N.E.2d at 131. Under the earlier criminal statutes, the father's interests were
adequately protected since abortion was legal only in the extraordinary circumstances of
danger to the mother's life or health. But see Herko v. Uviller, 203 Misc. 108, 114 N.Y.S.2d
618 (Sup. Ct. 1952) (wife's consent to a legal abortion performed without her husband's
consent held to preclude his recovery for loss of consortium and deprivation of his offspring).
As these statutes were revised and liberalized, only one state provided for the consent of the
husband before a woman could have an abortion. WASH. REv. CODE § 9.02.070 (1974). For an
excellent review of the rights of the father as reflected in case law and statutes see Note,
Abortion: The Father's Rights, 42 U. CiN. L. REv. 441 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Father's
Rights].
In those states that did not expressly provide for spousal consent, many local hospitals
included provisions for the husband's consent in their own regulations, no doubt strongly
influenced by Touriel v. Benveniste, Civil No. 776,790 (Cal. Sup. Ct., Oct. 20, 1961). This
case held that the wife's consent to an illegal abortion was no defense to the husband's suit
for damages to his legally protected interest in his unborn child. While the court's motive
Duquesne Law Review Vol. 13: 599
the predisposing factor in Doe was the Supreme Court's extension
of the right of personal privacy to include a woman's decision to
terminate her pregnancy. It was this holding, rather than the ration-
ale used by the Court in Roe v. Wade, that bound the Doe court.'6
The extent to which the constitutional right of privacy recognized
in Roe is to be protected depends on the balancing of interests and,
implicitly, on the scope of protection afforded.'7 Just as the Court
did not specify the source of the right of privacy,'8 neither did it
define its scope.'" Griswold v. Connecticut'" reflected the Court's
frequent emphasis on the importance of privacy in the family and
the marriage relation;' in contrast, Roe v. Wade secured individual
privacy against unwarranted state interference." Certainly, both
the family as a unit and the woman as an individual have a right of
privacy against the state. But once the woman enters the marriage
relation and her right is seen in the context of a family or quasi-
family setting, should her individual right of privacy remain im-
mune from state intercession on the father's behalf?" That the Roe
may have been to enhance the deterrent effect of the criminal statute, the father's articulated
interests do not suddenly vanish once abortion is legalized. But see Father's Rights, supra at
445.
16. After the 1973 decisions, recognition of an enforceable right in the husband to
prevent the abortion would raise serious constitutional questions. Although the court
[sic] did not pass on the husband's right, it used language inconsistent with such a
right.
. . . Some things must be left to private agreement.
314 N.E.2d at 132.
17. See Dixon, The Griswold Penumbra: Constitutional Charter for an Expanded Law of
Privacy?, 64 MICH. L. Ray. 197 (1965).
18. The Court stated:
This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept
of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, . . . in the
Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to the people, is broad enough to encompass
a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.
410 U.S. at 153. The Court obviously preferred to predicate the right of privacy on the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment, the approach taken by Justice Harlan in his
concurring opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 500 (1965).
19. The Court went on to say: "the right of personal privacy includes the abortion deci-
sion, but. . . this right is not unqualified and must be considered against important state
interests in regulation." 410 U.S. at 154.
20. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
21. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
22. 410 U.S. at 163 (1973).
23. See Father's Rights, supra note 15, at 460. Since the contractual nature of marriage
imposes certain rights and duties that would not otherwise exist, Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S.
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Court left open the validity of spousal consent statutes 4 would seem
to indicate the right may be restricted for reasons other than those
which are defined as "compelling state interests."25 While purport-
ing not to decide this issue, stating "some things must be left to
private agreement,"2 6 the Doe court in fact decided it by limiting its
analysis to the interests of the woman in relation to the state.
INTEREST IN PROCREATION
The majority in Doe reasoned that since the state cannot directly
interfere with a woman's abortion decision, it cannot, through a
private individual, effectuate the same result and enter a zone
which the Supreme Court has determined to be distinctly private.27
But a closer examination of family and tort law indicates that the
state frequently enforces private rights on behalf of the individ-
ual-rights which the state on its own behalf could never enforce.
Looking to both legal and philosophical sources, Justice Reardon,
dissenting in Doe, described the rights of procreation and parent-
hood recognized by domestic, tort, and property law.2" By focusing
on the bare holding of Roe, the majority was able to ignore the
relational interests underlying all these areas.
Each state has its own laws regulating marriage, annulment, and
divorce.29 It is generally accepted that annulment is granted where
one of the parties misrepresents, at the time of the marriage, his or
her intention to have children-reasoning that procreation is funda-
mental to marriage and such misrepresentation is similar to fraud
in the marriage contract.3 ° One state has granted divorce on the
645, 663 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting), perhaps Roe is not so readily extended to the
married individual.
It can be argued that when Ms. Doe married and engaged in sexual intercourse she waived
her right of privacy. This argument is especially cogent when, as here, the pregnancy was
desired by both the husband and the wife at the time of conception. 314 N.E.2d at 129. See
Note, Abortion: The Future Cases: Fathers' Rights, 8 U. SAN FAN. L. REv. 472, 482-85 (1973).
But see Jones v. Smith, 278 So. 2d 339, 343 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973) (rejecting the idea of a
single woman's waiver by the mere fact of her pregnancy).
24. See note 3 supra.
25. See note 9 supra.
26. 314 N.E.2d at 132. See note 16 supra.
27. 314 N.E.2d at 132.
28. Id. at 137 (noting the rights of the father in custody, adoption, wrongful death, and
distribution of estates).
29. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. chs. 207-08 (1958).
30. H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 111-12 (1968).
1975
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ground of "constructive desertion" when a spouse refused to have
sexual intercourse without the use of contraception.3' Underlying
judicial decisions to grant annulment or divorce is the notion of an
implied contractual right of each spouse to have children." Because
of statutes prohibiting adultery, and because the womb has yet to
be supplanted by the test tube, the courts must tacitly recognize
such an implied contract, or allow a woman to prevent her husband
from ever having children.
It has been suggested that, like a spouse's refusal to conceive, the
husband's refusal to consent to his wife's abortion be made eviden-
tiary grounds for divorce.3 This in fact was suggested as an alterna-
tive remedy by the court in Doe.34 The inconsistency of the court's
Massachusetts permits annulment for fraudulent representations which go to the very essence
of the marriage. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 207, § 14 (1958). No Massachusetts case has dealt
with the issue of a refusal to bear children as grounds for annulment. Except where the
marriage has not been consummated, the denial of sexual intercourse is not grounds for
annulment. Sasserno v. Sasserno, 240 Mass. 583, 134 N.E. 239 (1922).
31. Kreyling v. Kreyling, 20 N.J. Misc. 52, 23 A.2d 800 (Ch. 1942). Contra Harrington v.
Harrington, 38 Del. 333, 192 A. 555 (Super. Ct. 1937), where the court did not accept the idea
of constructive desertion: "[S]exual intercourse, and the consequent propagation of chil-
dren, is not the sole duty incident to the marriage contract." Id. at 338-39, 192 A. at 557.
In spite of a judicial tendency to view children as essential to the marriage, sterility, unless
known and undisclosed at the time of marriage, is not grounds for divorce in most states. Nor
would a sterilization furnish grounds for divorce unless it could be shown the operation was
sought pursuant to an undisclosed pre-marital plan. Note, Elective Sterilization, 113 U. PA.
L. REv. 415, 438-39 (1965). See Murray v. VanDevander, 522 P.2d 302 (Okla. Ct. App. 1974):
We have found no authority. . . which holds that the husband has a right to a child-
bearing wife as an incident to their marriage. . . . We find that the right of a person
who is capable of competent consent to control his own body is paramount.
Id. at 304. Compare Pratt v. Davis, 224 111. 300, 79 N.E. 562 (1906), where a physician was
held liable for sterilizing an incompetent woman without her husband's consent. Because she
was of unsound mind and incapable of consenting, his consent was required for the steriliza-
tion. This type of analysis, premised on an implied contractual right to have children, was
not considered by the Doe court except in the most cursory fashion. See note 34 infra.
32. Note, Willful Refusal to Have or Bear Children as Grounds for Divorce or Annulment,
55 YmE L.J. 596, 596-97 (1946).
33. FAMILY LAw Comment, supra note 9, at 325.
34. 314 N.E.2d at 133. The court merely posits this as an option available to the husband,
but does not explain on what statutory grounds a divorce could be granted. Massachusetts
has never entertained constructive desertion as grounds for divorce; only physical desertion
for a one year period is recognized. MAss. GE. LAws ANN. ch. 208, § 1 (Supp. 1975). If divorce
were granted in such a situation, it would be based not on fraud in the marriage contract,
but rather on breach of that contract. See Kreyling v. Kreyling, 20 N.J. Misc. 52, 23 A.2d
800 (Ch. 1942); note 31 supra and accompanying text. If divorce is a possibility stemming
from an unconsented-to abortion, this could provide compelling grounds for hospitals and
doctors to enact spousal consent provisions-in effect viewing both the husband and wife as
patients. See 314 N.E.2d at 137 (Reardon, J., dissenting); cf. Note, Elective Sterilization, 113
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reasoning should be clear. On the one hand, the court flatly denied
the existence of any legal rights in the husband while, on the other,
it hinted that procuring an abortion without the husband's consent
could be potential grounds for divorce or separation. Apart from the
inconsistency of the court's analysis, there is a real question of the
adequacy of the suggested relief to protect the father's interest in
the child. Divorce would only serve to leave the husband free to
remarry a more "family-minded woman." 5
RELATIONAL INTEREST
The topics that have been addressed illustrate the implied con-
tractual right of the husband in procreation that is breached by the
abortion. Abortion has the further effect of foreclosing the object of
procreation, i.e., the parent-child relationship. 3 This relational in-
terest is emphasized in the areas of custody and adoption and in
some states is protected by an action similar to consortium .3 Those
rights which are recognized in the case of interference with an
already-existing relation would seem to extend to the situation of
abortion which completely deprives the father of such a relation.
The law imposes upon the father the duty of support not only once
the child is born 38 but for the period during which the child is in
utero.3 5 To offset this duty, the law defends the father's interest in
U. PA. L. REv. 415, 438-39 (1965) (suggesting that for purposes of sterilization, husband and
wife should both be viewed as patients). But cf. O'Beirne v. Superior Court, 1 Civil No. 25,174
(Cal. Sup. Ct. Dec. 6, 1967) (because abortion is a medical rather than a legal issue, only the
wife's consent is necessary).
35. FAMILY LAW Comment, supra note 9, at 322.
36. See generally Foster, Relational Interests of the Family, 1962 U. ILL. L.F. 493.
37. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRTs § 124, at 883 (4th ed. 1971); see Daily v.
Parker, 152 F.2d 174 (7th Cir. 1945) (minor child has a cause of action against a third party
for alienation of his father's affections). Massachusetts has declined to extend consortium to
the parent-child relationship because of the possibility of fraudulent suits and the difficulty
of determining damages. Nelson v. Richwagen, 326 Mass. 485, 487, 95 N.E.2d 545, 546 (1950).
38. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 273, § 1 (Supp. 1975), imposes criminal penalties when a
husband or father unreasonably neglects or refuses to support his wife and minor child. See
also Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973) (illegitimate children held entitled to support from
their natural fathers under the equal protection clause). It has even been suggested that, due
to the trend away from bastardization, a child who is the product of artificial insemination
by a third-party donor (AID child) should be held legitimate for purposes of support, in spite
of the lack of the husband's consent to the procedure. 23 BUFF. L. REv. 548, 561 (1974). Not
only is the father responsible for supporting the child if born, he will most likely be respon-
sible for the expense of an abortion, either directly or indirectly through his insurance
payments.
39. People v. Yates, 114 Cal. App. 782, 786, 298 P. 961, 963 (1931). But see Burns v. Alcala,
1975
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adoption and custody proceedings which, like abortion, terminate
his parental rights." The same protections given in adoption and
custody proceedings-the consent requirement and the right to a
hearing-could readily be extended to the abortion decision.
Another example of a relational interest arguably still recognized
after Roe v. Wade is recovery for wrongful death caused by prenatal
injuries.4' The woman's consent to the abortion would be an effec-
tive defense for the physician if the woman sues him for wrongful
death, but it is not clear if her consent would preclude the non-
consenting father's recovery. The possibility of recovery by the fa-
ther rests on the unborn child's status as a "person" within the
meaning of the state's wrongful death statute." In Massachusetts it
has been held that a non-viable fetus must be born alive in order to
gain the status of personage.4 3 Depending on the method used to
abort and the lifesaving measures taken, the child in Doe could have
been born alive and survived, if only for a few hours, with the aid
of respirators."
If there is a possibility that the husband could recover for the
wrongful death of his offspring in such a case, should he not be
entitled to a hearing to determine the bona fides of his refusal to
consent, to enjoin the abortion and thus make a wrongful death suit
unnecessary?45 Doe has produced the anomalous situation of grant-
43 U.S.L.W. 4374 (8th Cir. Mar. 18, 1975) (unborn child not a "dependent" within the
meaning of the Social Security Act entitling an expectant mother to AFDC payments).
40. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (putative father entitled to a hearing as to
parental fitness before his child can be taken away from him).
41. But see Father's Rights, supra note 15, at 465, suggesting that the Roe Court's recogni-
tion of a compelling state interest only at the third trimester of pregnancy will preclude
fathers from maintaining a wrongful death action for the abortion of a pre-viable fetus.
42. Although a fetus is not a "person" for purposes of criminal law, it can be a person
within the meaning of civil statutes. State v. Dickinson, 28 Ohio St. 2d 65, 70, 275 N.E.2d
599, 602 (1971).
43. Leccese v. McDonough, 279 N.E.2d'339, 341 (Mass. 1972). In Torigian v. Watertown
News Co., 352 Mass. 446, 225 N.E.2d 926 (1967), an auto accident caused the premature birth
of a non-viable three and one-half month old fetus. Intestate, who lived two and one-half
hours after birth, was held to have been a "person" within the meaning of the Massachusetts
Wrongful Death Statute, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 229, § 1 (Supp. 1975). Although the same
question has not been addressed in the case of a viable fetus, 13 J. FAMILY L. 99, 111 (1974),
it would seem that the same result would be reached.
44. This defendant was approximately eighteen weeks pregnant; allowing for the usual
error in estimations of this sort, she could have been in her twentieth week. See OBSTrmscs
AND GYNECOLOGY ANNUAL: 1973, at 167-72 (R. Wynn ed. 1973).
45. It is suggested that, just as the state's interest in potential life becomes more compel-
ling as the third trimester approaches, see note 9 supra, so does that of the potential father.
Vol. 13: 599
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ing the woman's physician substantive rights superior to those of the
father." Yet, as was seen above, the father still retains the duty to
support the child47 and the possibility of bringing a wrongful death
action against the physician if an abortion is performed without his
consent.
RECENT CASES
Case law relied on by the Doe court involved constitutional chal-
lenges to state spousal consent statutes; the suggestion seems to be
that if spousal consent statutes could not be enforced, neither could
injunctive relief be granted in Doe. A close look at this case law
indicates the invalidity of spousal consent statutes is not nearly as
settled an issue as the court intimates.
Jones v. Smith" merely held the plaintiff, as putative father, was
not within the purview of the spousal consent provision" and denied
the requested relief. It nowhere ruled the consent requirement un-
constitutional-indeed, it indicated any spousal consent require-
ment should be extended to include putative fathers as well.50 The
statute in Coe v. Gerstein"' was found too broad in allowing the
husband to refuse consent arbitrarily. 5 The court indicated, how-
ever, that a statute protecting the father's individual interests, if
not arbitrary and if uninfluenced by the state's interest in protect-
ing maternal health and potential life,53 would fall outside Roe v.
Wade and would withstand constitutional attack.5'
46. During the first trimester the woman and her physician are the principal parties
involved in determining whether an abortion should be performed. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 163 (1973).
47. But see Jones v. Smith, 278 So. 2d 339, 343-44 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973) (mere support
requirement not sufficient to establish a right in the father to prevent an otherwise legitimate
abortion).
48. 278 So. 2d 339 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 958 (1974).
49. FiA. STAT. ANN. § 458.22(3) (1973,).
50. The court stated:
Although legislative enactments are presumed to be valid and the requirement for
the consent of a "husband" is constitutional whatever may be contended with respect
to the invalidity of a distinction between "husband" or putative father, such conten-
tion would simply be immaterial.
278 So. 2d at 342 n.3.
51. 376 F. Supp. 695 (S.D. Fla. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 279 (1974).
52. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 458.22(3) (1973) requires the written consent of the husband and
the wife before a pregnancy can be terminated. Only if he is "voluntarily living apart from
the wife" or if there is a life-threatening emergency is the husband's consent not required.
53. See note 9 supra.
54. 376 F. Supp. at 697; Pound v. Pound, 42 U.S.L.W. 2456 (111. Cir. Ct. Jan. 31, 1974)
1975
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The effect of a spousal consent statute (and by analogy, injunc-
tive relief) would be to lessen the woman's control over her own
body. But if the father is willing to assume custody and support, and
if the conception had been a desired one, perhaps requiring a full-
term pregnancy is justified. Of course, it would have to be shown
the father's consent was not withheld arbitrarily or capriciously.
These are formidable obstacles but not sufficient to totally ignore
the father's rights in the abortion decision. 5
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
It is a basic rule of equity that injunctive relief is given only where
relief at law is inadequate and only where enforcement of the injunc-
tion is feasible." The "inadequacy" requirement was satisfied in
Doe, since it can hardly be said that giving grounds for divorce is
an adequate substitute for loss of a child. Enforcement was feasible
since there was no indication that the mother would have intention-
ally disregarded an injunction." Enforcement, however, could be-
come a practical problem-the court might have to face the compli-
cation of accidental or spontaneous abortion." Could the mother be
cited for contempt in such a case?
The injunction sought here would operate in all respects as a
decree for specific performance, since enjoining the wife from
breaching the provisions of the implied contract to bear a child is
an indirect means of enforcing those provisions.59 The bases underly-
ing refusal to specifically enforce personal service contracts-the
impracticality of judicial supervision, the thirteenth amendment's
ban on involuntary servitude, and the adverse effects of compulsion
(any restriction on the abortion decision is a legislative matter). But see Tribe, supra note
12, at 42 n.182 (suggesting that the interest of those seeking restrictions on abortion is in
preserving potential life rather than in protecting the rights of the father).
55. Cf. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656-57 (1972) (although speed and efficiency are
to be encouraged, such considerations should not supersede recognized constitutional rights).
56. 314 N.E.2d at 134 (Hennessey, J., dissenting in part).
57. Id. at 135 (Reardon, J., dissenting).
58. Spontaneous abortions may be brought on by conscious or unconscious psychological
factors, such as the burden of having to carry an unwanted pregnancy to term. Pholman,
Unwanted Conceptions: Research on Undesirable Consequences, 14 EUGENICS Q. 143, 144
(1967).




in a relation requiring mutual respect and cooperation10-apply with
equal force to the situation in Doe.
Conceding the problems inherent in granting injunctive relief in
this case, the court was not precluded from granting the less drastic
alternative of a declaratory judgment." Granting declaratory relief
might not fulfill this plaintiff's demands (since the wife could not
be cited for contempt),62 but it would give guidance to the legisla-
ture in any attempt to enact a spousal consent statute and to hospi-
tals wishing to regulate abortions. 3 Rather than discuss the
appropriateness of a declaratory judgment, the court seemed to
have overlooked it as a viable alternative in the face of its inability
to grant injunctive relief.
CONCLUSION
The Doe court discussed neither the inferences to be drawn from
the legislature's silence, nor the propriety of judicial, rather than
legislative, determination of the father's rights. In its decision to
deny the relief requested, the court may have been influenced by the
failure of the Massachusetts legislature to follow other state legisla-
tures" which had enacted spousal consent statutes protecting the
father's interest. This silence could understandably be interpreted
in two ways: The legislature intended that no affirmative action be
taken on the husband's behalf;5 or the legislature felt the Supreme
Court's ruling in Roe v. Wade was so pervasive that it precluded any
competing interest from being recognized. 6 Abortion is a subject
60. Van Hecke, Changing Emphases in Specific Performance, 40 N. CAR. L. REv. 1, 16-
20 (1961). But see N.Y. Times, Jan. 29, 1972, § 1, at 4, col. 3 (decision by the Ontario Supreme
Court enjoining a woman in her sixteenth week of pregnancy from having a therapeutic
abortion).
61. See Columbia Pictures Corp. v. De Toth, 26 Cal. 2d 753, 760, 161 P.2d 217, 221 (1945).
Declaratory judgments are statutory in origin and may be granted regardless of the possibility
of injunctive relief. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 231A, § 1 (1959). It is characterized here as a
less drastic remedy since disregard of the judgment by the defendant would only be "inappro-
priate," not contempt. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 471 (1974), citing Perez v. Le-
desma, 401 U.S. 82, 124-26 (1971) (separate opinion of Brennan, J.).
62. See note 61 supra.
63. 314 N.E.2d at 130. Declaratory relief would also seem to be the most effective means
of assuring that the woman is fully aware of the impact of her decision on the marriage
relation.
64. For a listing of those states which enacted consent statutes following Roe v. Wade see
FAMILY LAw Comment, supra note 9, at 312-13 n.9.
65. Cf. Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100, 109 (1890).
66. Cf. Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 318-19 (1851).
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fraught with moral, ethical, and religious overtones, none of which
was adequately considered by the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade.67
Doe perpetuated this trend, as the court focused on the mother's
right of privacy to the exclusion of the heretofore unarticulated
interest of the father.
The purpose of this discussion has not been to dispute the holding
of Doe v. Doe but rather to point out some considerations the court
overlooked in its desire to be consistent with Roe v. Wade. Clearly,
the impracticality of enforcing an injunction was a major considera-
tion in the court's refusal to grant relief. In denying the injunction,
the court recognized the practical difficulties and deliterious effects
of such an order. In refusing to grant declaratory relief, however, the
court left future fathers with no enforceable rights against the
mother. Furthermore, the court has placed the added burden on the
legislature of rebutting the presumption of unconstitutionality of
future spousal consent statutes. 8
The Doe court has added considerably to the impact of Roe v.
Wade through its extreme emphasis on individual choice and right
of privacy. The Supreme Court has indicated that a state cannot
interfere with a woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy-but
is her individual right so absolute as to abrogate the rights of the
husband and father? After Doe, one wonders just how far the court
is willing to go in its quest for maximizing individual choice, a quest
which presently appears to ignore much of our domestic and tort
law. It is suggested here that rights other than those of the mother
are involved in the abortion decision, rights which must be reckoned
with, particularly since Roe v. Wade. An open balancing of all inter-
ests by the court would have provided more concrete guidance for
hospitals, the legislature, and the judiciary.
Judith Haskell Zernich
67. Tribe, supra note 12, at 51-52.
68. 314 N.E.2d at 134 (Hennessey, J., dissenting in part).
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